July 24, 2013

FINEST HOUR 124, AUTUMN 2004

BY CHRISTOPHER C. HARMON AND PAUL H.COURTENAY

Professor Harmon teaches at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia. He is an academic adviser to The Churchill Centre and served as moderator to the second Library of Congress Symposium.

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THE SECOND LIBRARY OF CONGRESS AND LONDON SYMPOSIA

This year has brought a parade of presentations on Winston Spencer Churchill to the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. The British statesman’s famously warm and multifaceted relationship with America was covered by an exhibit on “Churchill and the Great Republic,” extended in its run into mid-July 2004, and now touring the U.S. in Omaha, Grand Rapids and Seattle. Two academic symposia were scheduled to complement the exhibit. The first (last issue, page 31) brought notable Britons and Americans together on February 19th to discuss Churchill’s rapport with the U.S. presidents of the 1940s and 1950s: Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower. The second symposium came on June 1st, with American scholars speaking about new views of Churchill.

Conceived by the Library, The Churchill Centre, and the Centre’s chairman of academic advisers James W. Muller, the conference featured five formal papers, each followed by interchange with the audience. Muller spoke on the American Civil War, titling his paper “The Noblest and Least Avoidable Conflict.” He explored Churchill’s thorough understanding of the American war but questioned his deference to Robert E. Lee, noting Churchill’s silence as to whether Lee, courted by both sides, made a choice that contravened political principles.

From Claremont McKenna College, long noted for admirable teachers of political philosophy, Professor Mark Blitz addressed “Churchill’s Understanding of Statesmanship: Lessons from America.” For Blitz, Churchill valued liberty—mutual adherence to liberty—even more than common language and literature, as the essence of Anglo-American unity. Sir Winston’s profound admiration for the U.S. did also include glimmers of doubt as to whether its constitution is too structured, and its Supreme Court too powerful.

Archival specialist Dr. Daun van Ee highlighted many of the displays in the Library of Congress exhibit, including a previously-hidden letter by the great Duke of Marlborough to Queen Anne, and fresh letters of 1898 to 1916 by his descendant Winston S. Churchill. A local “live wire” and scholar of British literature, Dr. Paul Cantor of the University of Virginia, aroused the audience to repeated bouts of laughter by relating many of Churchill’s observations on American food and culture. Cambridge University’s archival counterpart, Allen Packwood, spoke to the theme: “The Empires of the Future are the Empires of the Mind: Churchill and Technology in the 20th and 21st Centuries.” He emphasized how the winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature was also the most serious proponent of scientific education—the focus in fact of Churchill College in Cambridge. As Director of the Churchill Archives Centre there, Mr. Packwood has been delivering well-received lectures in Washington in connection with the joint exhibit at our Library.

For those who missed the exhibit at the Library of Congress, there is a very good book produced by The Churchill Centre: Churchill and the Great Republic. For those who were unable to be with us for the June 1st academic symposium, a two-CD set was made on the spot: “New Research on Churchill in America.” Both can be purchased from the Churchill Centre at (888) WSC-1874. —CCH

JUST SURFACED: CHURCHILL’S PREDICTION OF WORLD WAR I

A bundle of rediscovered letters written by Churchill and accidentally misfiled for decades in a U.S. library predicted the First World War two years before it broke out. The letters were from Churchill to his cousin, the Duke of Marlborough, in 1912, when WSC was First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Duke donated his collection of Churchill’s letters to the Library of Congress, but a librarian filed them in the wrong place. Librarian of Congress James Billington said they had not been seen in decades.

After lying forgotten for years, the collection of letters was discovered by CC member Daun Van Ee, the military historian and archivist who prepared the “Churchill and the Great Republic” exhibition.

Historian Andrew Roberts hailed the discovery: “This sounds like a tremendously interesting find, since pretty much everything that Churchill ever wrote has been pored over by historians His prescience in predicting the Great War is absolutely typical of the man. His reference to the Ottoman Empire has eerie echoes, considering his own reputation was to suffer over the Dardanelles campaign three years later.”

In the letters, Churchill describes the dangerous political situation created by the hostilities between the Turks (the Ottoman Empire) and an alliance of Balkan states. The European powers, already at odds with each other, were ranging themselves on either side, with Britain opposed to the Turks and Germany sympathetic to them.

“The European situation is far from safe and anything might happen,” Churchill wrote. “It only needs a little ill will or bad faith on the part of a great power to precipitate a far greater conflict.”

Two years later, the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in the Balkans, providing the spark for the war in Europe which Churchill had predicted. Churchill lost his cabinet post after the bloody Gallipoli campaign on the Gallipoli isthmus in Turkey, in which thousands of British, Australian and New Zealand soldiers died.

LONDON SEMINAR, JUNE 8TH

A seminar was organised by the Institute of United States Studies, University of London, in collaboration with the Eccles Centre for American Studies at the British Library and the Churchill Archives Centre at Churchill College, Cambridge. The keynote speaker was David Cannadine, author of In Churchill’s Shadow: Confronting the Past in Modern Britain, who drew attention to Kipling’s poem Recessional: “Lo, all our pomp of yesterday | Is one with Niniveh and Tyre.” This, Cannadine said, showed Kipling’s understanding that the British Empire could not last forever, while The White Man’s Burden indicated Kipling’s belief that the United States would take Britain’s place as world leader.

Churchill had not been impressed by the United States during his early visits, but his more extensive journeys there in 1929 and 1931/32 changed his mind; from that time he understood its vast abundance and industrial productivity and became convinced that cooperation with the United States could lead to economic and political stability. Churchill worked hard at cajoling Roosevelt through his speeches and correspondence, while FDR looked on WSC as a Victorian Tory. The high point of their relationship was from December 1941 to September 1943, but the shift in relative strengths allowed Roosevelt to bypass Churchill and approach Stalin unilaterally. Churchill played a weak hand very well, but his high hopes for Anglo-American unity were unrealised. In Cannadine’s view Churchill’s legacy is ambiguous.

Three discussions followed comprising three speakers each. The first was “Churchill and American Values: the Contradictions.” Geoffrey Best, author of Churchill: A Study in Greatness, said Churchill’s mother had lived most of her life in Europe, so she had no American influences to impart. WSC, on his first visit in 1895, hated the American press and found West Point discipline detestable; however, he met Bourke Cockran, from whom he learnt oratorical skills. After the Great War, Churchill was in demand as a speaker at US events in London, such as visits by prominent groups. He disliked Roosevelt’s “New Deal” policy, but during the 1930s, FDR had become anti-Fascist and saw Churchill as the only possible bulwark in Britain.

Roland Quinault, former Hon. Secretary of the Royal Historical Society, titled his contribution “Personal Connection in Peace and War.” Churchill’s tour of the American Civil War sites in 1929 led to his recognition of inherent American military qualities. During the war, meeting important U.S. visitors in the relaxed atmosphere of Chequers resulted in much closer personal relations than more formal encounters in Downing Street. Quinault believes Churchill’s biggest mistake was not to have attended Roosevelt’s funeral, missing an early opportunity to meet President Truman.

ICS (UK) member John Ramsden, author of Man of the Century: Winston Churchill and His Legend since 1945, spoke on “Churchill, America and the English-Speaking Peoples.” He noted how WSC’s famous broadcast about “The Few” in August 1940 alluded to the United States: “…Like the Mississippi, it just keeps rolling along”—a well understood reference to the “Showboat” song Old Man River. Ramsden noted that neither Kennedy nor Ed Murrow first said that Churchill “mobilised the English language and sent it into battle”— the remark was first made by Beverley Nicholls. WSC’s state funeral had many American touches: The Battle Hymn of the Republic, a eulogy by President Eisenhower, the Stars and Stripes in the streets. The special relationship mattered most to Churchill. When he travelled with Truman to Fulton in 1946, he said if he were born again he would wish to be born American.

The second panel was “Decline and Ascendancy: America in Britain’s Place.” Correlli Barnett, former Keeper of the Churchill Archives Centre, spoke on “Punching Above his Weight: Churchill and the Grand Strategic Debates.” British weaknesses meant that he had poor cards to play. Strategic overstretch, due to the widespread Empire, put a burden on the Royal Navy in protecting the passage of food imports (plus payment for these imports). The Chiefs of Staff thought Britain could only win a long war; the Treasury felt it could afford only a short one. Though Churchill was a supplicant, he dealt with FDR as an equal; his genius lay in covering up the lack of national parity. In the early stages of U.S. belligerency the British arrived for conferences fully prepared with no internal disagreements; they thus had an advantage over the Americans who did not, at first, have the same efficient mechanisms. The Americans wanted an early invasion of Western Europe, but the British, with limited manpower, preferred peripheral operations. In 1943 at Casablanca the British persuaded the Americans that an invasion would have to be postponed till 1944.

David Reynolds, author of In Command of History: Winston Churchill and “The Second World War,” spoke on “Churchill and Roosevelt: Partner or Poodle?” He said it was Churchill’s fault that we have a particular vision of him, because of his writing and speeches. He strove to shape the future rather than describe the past. Reynolds gave two examples of where Churchill was more manipulative than might be realised. In June 1940 the fall of France changed the British position overnight. In public Churchill referred to Germany’s underlying weakness and the imminence of a U.S. entry into the war; but privately he was unwilling to give secrets or other bonuses to the United States until they were much closer to involvement, and preferred a quid pro quo.

His war memoirs do not refer to a meeting with the chiefs of staff at which it was agreed that, if they had a free hand, the Normandy invasion would be at the bottom of their list of priorities (given propitious circumstances in the Mediterranean). The memoirs accurately record General Alexander’s assessment of the situation in Italy in October 1943, but omit the part in which Eisenhower disputed Alexander, saying everything was secondary to Overlord. Churchill’s preferred strategy can be debated, but the idea that he was willing to stand up to the United States is reinforced and should be taken seriously. (See also pages 31-37. -Ed.)

Klaus Larres, author of Churchill’s Cold War: The Politics of Personal Diplomacy, spoke on “Vision, Power and Influence: Churchill, Truman and Eisenhower in the Cold War World.” Churchill despaired at American willingness to confront rather than negotiate with the Soviet Union. At Fulton, the media had attacked Churchill for his anti-communist position; Truman denied foreknowledge of the speech, but he had read it on the train beforehand. The media misunderstood the speech, ignoring what Churchill said about the need for peaceful reconciliation. He later believed that nuclear weapons had made negotiation a necessity. But the United States built up its armaments in advance of any negotiations, a position on which WSC was skeptical. Eisenhower, while friendly with Churchill personally, spoke through his hardline Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Churchill displayed vision after 1945 and 1951, but was hampered by reality and could not overcome U.S. recalcitrance.

The third panel was on “Atlanticism, Anti-Americanism and Churchill’s Legacy.” Alex Danchev, coeditor of the Alanbrooke Diaries, spoke on “Manglo-Relations: the Use and Abuse of the Churchillian Ideal.” He saw the mobilising notion of a special relationship, engaged by all British Prime Ministers except Edward Heath. Churchill was “the evangelist of the English-speaking peoples.” Harry Hopkins’ wartime pledge to Churchill that America would be with Britain “even unto the end,” which had brought tears to the PM’s eyes, was repeated (in not quite the same words) in Tony Blair’s commitment to George Bush over Iraq. But though Churchill lives on, the currency is now surely debased. “Manglo-relations” were the key to the 21st century, Danchev opined: Tony Blair was increasingly fervent and increasingly irrelevant, “a Churchillian trait.”

John Dumbrell, author of Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After, spoke on “Churchill and American Politics: JFK to GWB.” In his view the shade of Churchill has appeared in the U.S. for forty years. Vietnam brought warnings on appeasement and Munich; in May 1970 President Nixon lectured protesting students on the lessons of the 1930s; when President Reagan was shot in 1981, he repeated Churchill’s line, “nothing is so exhilarating as to be shot at without result”; after the terrorist attacks of 2001, Mayor Giuliani invoked Churchill, while the current President frequently refers to him. President
Kennedy was an admirer and presented WSC with American citizenship. President Johnson was also an admirer, who frequently recycled WSC’s sayings. It was not till 1980 that President Carter started quoting Churchill (“the unnecessary war”), which was too late for any beneficial effect. President Reagan was the most frequent user of Churchill’s name, referring to his own previous political “wilderness” and the practice of changing political parties, making an analogy to radar when defending his Strategic Defense Initiative. When conferring with Gorbachev, Reagan pointed to Churchill as a leader prepared to make concessions.

The final speaker was William Roger Louis, coeditor of and contributor to Churchill: A Major New Assessment of His Life in Peace and War. His theme was “Churchill and the British Empire,” with emphasis on the Middle East, notably Palestine and Iraq. Churchill’s hands-on experience at the Colonial Office in 1905-08 and 1921-22 showed him to be an interventionist with a high degree of inventiveness. He neglected some Colonial Office economic problems and was not much interested in the West Indies. He took it for granted that Britain must control the Suez Canal and, by extension, Egypt itself. Although he was blind to peoples, considering even Australians to be second class, racial prejudice was not translated into policy. After the Amritsar massacre in India in 1919, he declared it to have been a monstrous event, which was crucial in shaping his belief that restraint should be the watchword and that the doctrine of minimum force should apply.

Turning to the Middle East, Roger Louis said that Churchill’s Zionist sympathies, though moderate, had been nurtured in his youth when dining with his parents’ Rothschild friends. As colonial secretary he had not been able to help the Zionists as much as he would have hoped. He did not want the responsibility for Palestine to become a burden to Britain, and would have been content for another power (perhaps the United States) to take over the mandate if the financial load became too onerous. He considered that the Arab population would be incapable of governing itself. In Iraq he was aware of the expense of an effective occupation by the Army and opted for much cheaper control through the air-power of the RAE He envisaged the creation of a semi-independent native state on the lines of the princely states of India, considering the population to be poor, backward and peppery. Yet there was a quality and intellect there which is hard to find in today’s Iraq. In conclusion, Louis said, Churchill could take a broad view, deal vigorously with problems, rise to occasions and work towards solutions. —PHC