April 7, 2015

Finest Hour 133, Winter 2006-07

Page 38

By Robert A. Courts

Hostages to Fortune: Winston Churchill and the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, by Arthur Nicholson. Sutton Publishing, 234 pages, illustrated, $34.95. Available from Amazon.com at $26.56.

It seems almost de rigueur that new books dealing with important aspects of the Second World War have to be subtitled Winston Churchill and… .As Prime Minister, Churchill could hardly complain, but this book’s subtitle really ought to be (for the sake of accuracy if not for publishing purposes) Churchill Pound, Phillips and the Loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse.

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The book takes a contained and structured approach to the story: dealing with the course of the tragedy first chronologically, dealing with each important event in self-contained blocks, before concluding that “in the end, it is Winston Churchill who should shoulder most of the blame.” Yet if there is one thing that this book’s methodical approach shows, it is that the reasons for the loss of the two ships were so manifold that such a conclusion is misleading.

There has to be some doubt over Churchill’s causative responsibility for the loss of the two capital ships. Yes, he was largely responsible for their despatch to Singapore. This was however perfectly justifiable in the twin interests of deterring Japan and of placing some British strength in the area of some of her most valuable possessions. Direct responsibility cannot, however, be traced any further to Churchill. The fact that the force was strategically unbalanced and lacking organic air power was largely owed to the terrible demands upon an overstretched and ill-prepared Britain.

Moreover, the decision to go to sea and seek to attack the Japanese invasion forces was that of Admiral Phillips—as was, most critically of all, the decision not to break radio silence and call for air cover. It appears that Churchill (via the Admiralty) probably was responsible for sending the “prodding signal” of 7 December 1941, asking “what action it would be possible to take with naval or air forces.” Nicholson uses the correct terminology in calling this signal a “prod”: what it does not do is stipulate what should be done—when, or where, or how. It does not, for example, state that air cover would not be essential. This, surely, is the abiding lesson of the episode: that capital ships were no longer safe unprotected under hostile skies. The book makes clear that a lack of awareness of air power was one of the otherwise highly respected Admiral Phillips’ shortcomings.

It is within a wartime Prime Minister’s role to ask for action to be taken. What is not acceptable is interference in operational military manoeuvres: this Churchill did not do. He may, as Nicholson argues, have known about the plan to go on the attack (although this is far from clear). But that is not the same as ordering it. Churchill’s role was political: how the war was fought was a military matter; while he may have been responsible for putting the ships in the area, what happened to them once they were there was not in his direct control.

Nicholson, however, appears to accept that the despatch of the ships was a justifiable deterrent move, but argues that they ought to have been withdrawn once it was clear the plan had failed. This has a superficial attraction, but to have withdrawn Britain’s most powerful assets at the very moment of enemy attack would not only have been antithetical to Royal Navy traditions, but would have sent the very worst signals to the Japanese (who respected the ships’ capabilities) and to the Australians (already alienated over the lack of investment in Singapore). These were crucial political considerations of which the military were blissfully free—but which Churchill could not afford to ignore.

Agree or disagree, however, this book is excellent debating fodder, and is a useful historical tool. Footnotes are extensive and meticulously researched, and there is a selection of primary documents in the appendix. Its structure and approach makes referring to one aspect of the story very easy, whilst the author’s passion makes for a fast reading book, drawing together all the strands of this famous but desperately sad story.