May 6, 2013

Finest Hour 151, Summer 2011

Page 51

The Goods on the Dards

Churchill’s Dilemma: The Real Story Behind the Origins of the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign, by Graham Clews. Hardbound, 344 pages, illus., $44.95, Kindle edition $36.

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There is every reason to be skeptical about the need for a new book on one of the most frequently scrutinized episodes of World War I, and of Churchill’s role in it. Is there really more to be said on the subject? This detailed new study shows that there is.

Churchill’s part in the Dardanelles campaign has always been controversial, but over the years a consensus has emerged. It is generally agreed, for example, that Churchill, a dedicated peripheral strategist, embraced the naval assault on Turkey to avoid the bloody stalemate on the Western Front. Once committed, it is said, he became obsessed. His enthusiasm for a strictly naval attack on the Dardanelles is commonly attributed to the initial unavailability of troops, while his later determination to obtain support from the army is seen as a belated acknowledgement that the naval attack had failed. But none of these assumptions should be taken for granted.

Clews takes a slightly different approach from other historians. Churchill, he writes, always preferred seizing an island off the German coast, even after the Dardanelles attack was approved. The capture of, say, Borkum, offered the best means of getting around the stalemate and defeating the primary enemy. But the monitors and other specialised craft needed for a Borkum operation were not ready, so he threw his support behind the Dardanelles, strictly as an interim measure. It seemed to offer the prospect of a major victory at little risk, one he thought could be wrapped up quickly, and resources shifted to one of his northern schemes.

Unlike many books that claim to tell the “real story,” Churchill’s Dilemma actually delivers the goods. Remarkably, nearly all the evidence Clews deploys has been available in published form for years, but this in no way diminishes his achievement. His analysis of the origins of the campaign is thorough and insightful, paying careful attention to all the major decisionmakers: Kitchener, Asquith, Lloyd George, Balfour, Hankey. But since Churchill’s role is the most frequently misunderstood, Clews naturally gives WSC the most attention.

It is hardly surprising, given the impact of the Dardanelles on Churchill’s subsequent reputation, that historians have tended to assume Churchill was more committed to it than he actually was. But by shifting the lens slightly, Clews brings Churchill’s actions into sharper focus. It is clear now, for example, why Churchill clung so stubbornly to a “ships alone” operation in January 1915, even though troops could have been found for a combined assault, and again in March, when the naval attack had faltered.

Churchill does not necessarily emerge from this reinterpretation with his reputation enhanced. Many of the standard criticisms of the First Lord for ignoring the advice of his professional advisers are reinforced by Clews’s study. But the book shows that there was a logic and a consistency to Churchill’s actions that are essential to understanding the origins of this controversial campaign.

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