November 10, 2015

Finest Hour 169, Summer 2015

Page 46

Review by Antoine Capet

Will Morrisey, Churchill and de Gaulle: The Geopolitics of Liberty. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. x + 435 pages, $85.00.
ISBN 978-1442241190


Churchill and DeGaulleThere are many books of the Churchill and… variety, but on this topic Will Morrisey’s offering has only one important predecessor, François Kersaudy’s “old” Churchill and de Gaulle. Kersaudy’s monograph set very high standards, and Morrisey, Professor of Politics at Hillsdale College, therefore faced a difficult task.

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Morrisey’s angle of attack is spelled out in his subtitle, The Geopolitics of Liberty. The introduction explains what he means by this—not an easy task, since it leads him into complex discussions of political philosophy, notably on the nature of the State: a guarantor or an enemy of liberty? For him, though—as for his two protagonists—there is no doubt: there can be no liberty without a strong State. He puts it vividly, “if your state fails, you won’t have Utopia but Afghanistan” (2). Having established that Churchill and de Gaulle were equally convinced of this, Morrisey justifies his use of “geopolitics” by pointing out the constraints which geography had always imposed on their countries.

Thus we have not simply another account of the personal relations between the two war leaders—though of course the book repeatedly alludes to them—but a discussion of how Churchill and de Gaulle did their best to further the political ideals in which they believed in the face of hostile forces, both geopolitical adversaries and unconvinced fellow-citizens and allies.

We have ten chapters in five complementary pairs: 1) The Greatness of Great Britain; 2) The Grandeur of France; 3) The Geopolitics of Great Britain; 4) …of France; 5) How Churchill Understood the Geopolitics of the First World War; 6) …de Gaulle…; 7) How Churchill Understood the Geopolitics of the Second World War 8) …de Gaulle…; 9) How Churchill Understood the Geopolitics of the Cold War; 10) …de Gaulle…; with a conclusion, The Geopolitics of Liberty.

“The Greatness of Great Britain” is largely devoted to the message that Churchill wanted to convey to his fellow-citizens in A History of the English-Speaking Peoples: that of a slow, but relentless march forward towards “a genuinely civilized or political society” (33). Likewise, “The Grandeur of France” rests almost entirely on an examination of de Gaulle’s ideas in three pre-war publications: La France et son Armée, Vers l’Armée de métier, and Le fil de l’épée. Towards the end of the chapter, we have the first intersection between the thought of the two leaders: “Politically, both statesmen insist on political union as the indispensable foundation of greatness.”

In “The Geopolitics of Great Britain,” Morrisey cites Churchill’s Marlborough as also revealing its author’s conception of Britain’s place in the world. The defeat of Louis XIV cleared the way for the building of a British Empire. But Churchill always kept his options open: “If it were lost, Churchill had two strategic moves to make: the return to North America, not as emperor but as ally; the turn to Europe, not as conqueror or even necessarily as liberator but as federator” (92). In contrast, “The Geopolitics of France” continues to rely on the same three books by de Gaulle, who questions the “utility” of imperial conquest, since “the French heartland remains vulnerable, with or without empire” (119). For the author, the parallel with Churchill’s “flexibility” is provided by de Gaulle’s “rapprochement with West Germany” (119).

The pattern is established: Morrisey examines the position and evolution of Churchill and de Gaulle in the light of their writings and later action. Thus, “How Churchill Understood the Geopolitics of the First World War” is largely an examination of what Churchill has to say in The World Crisis, while the companion de Gaulle chapter draws heavily on La discorde chez l’ennemi. This interesting chapter ends on a far-reaching comparison between Churchill “the great parliamentarian [who] associated political authority first of all with speaking” and de Gaulle, who “located authority in the silence of the commander” (175)—a thesis that only holds good until 18 June 1940, when it can be argued that de Gaulle gradually established his “political authority first of all [by] speaking.”

Naturally, the Second World War chapters are based on Memoirs of the Second World War and Mémoires de guerre. The Churchill chapter understandably gives pride of place to the prime minister’s cultivation of the Special Relationship with President Roosevelt, “our best friend” (211). Conversely, the de Gaulle chapter, while mentioning that “Roosevelt did not understand de Gaulle and could extend him no sympathy” (248), dwells on the long-term calculations made by de Gaulle, first on how to maintain the alliance with Britain in spite of all the frequent disputes with Churchill (“De Gaulle would have preferred a closer alliance with the British,” 246), then how to ensure the Free French presence at the Liberation, and above all how to restore France’s position as a Great Power after the war. Morrisey notes that “de Gaulle’s absence from Yalta allowed him, and through him France, to condemn the settlement without sharing any responsibility for it” (251).

The sharing of the spoils of the vanquished at Yalta, and later at Potsdam, did not of course lead to a stable settlement of the war, but to a new form of war, the Cold War, which constitutes the object of the last two chapters. Churchill is described as having lost all his hopes—or illusory expectations— when he retired. De Gaulle never entertained any illusions that the power struggle between human groups could disappear in the predictable future. All his policy was dictated by what he saw as realistically possible, for France, for the former French Empire (in the process of liquidation), for Western Europe (in the process of political consolidation), and for the precarious peace of the world in the nuclear age. His years in power from 1958 are presented in a very favourable light.

My only negative comment—probably attributable to the publisher rather than the author—is the awkward system of references. The copious number of endnotes (a good thing in itself) makes constant manipulation tedious, and the abbreviations are not consistent: e.g., for The Hinge of Fate, we have now HOF, now THF (387)—even worse, TGS repeatedly appears on pp. 384 ff. and is not listed in the bibliography: could it be a misprint for TGA, The Grand Alliance? Yet the proofreading must have been meticulous, since I could not find a single mistake in the treacherous French accords and accents.

So this very attractive book is warmly recommended. Churchill and de Gaulle does not really reveal any new “facts.” Its value lies in the superbly informed interpretation of these “facts,” which constantly stimulates the reader’s quest for a balanced assessment of the real role at the time (and later legacy) of the two leaders’ action.

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