November 10, 2015

Finest Hour 169, Summer 2015

Page 28

By Terry Reardon

Terry Reardon is Vice-Chairman of the International Churchill Society Canada and author of Winston Churchill and Mackenzie King: So Similar, So Different.


Strategically poised just off the north coast of Scotland, the Orkney Islands almost totally encircle the bay known as Scapa Flow—312 square kilometres (120 square miles) of cold salt water. Historically, the British Home Fleet had been located near the Channel Islands to keep it in close proximity to its old maritime adversaries France, Spain, and the Netherlands. In 1904, however, in response to the buildup of the German Fleet, the Admiralty decided that a northern base was needed to control defences in the North Sea.

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The First World War

On the night of 29–30 July 1914 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, convinced that war was inevitable, requested and received approval from Prime Minister Asquith to send the Grand Fleet from Portland through the English Channel and the Straits of Dover to the safety of Scapa Flow. The First Lord received the news of the Fleet’s arrival with relief. The Royal Navy was ready for action when war was declared on 4 August.

In early October the Admiralty yacht Enchantress dropped anchor off Scapa Pier. On board were Asquith and Churchill. A meeting was held with the principal naval personnel, including the First Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, and the new Commander of the Home Fleet, Sir John Jellicoe. The outcome was a detailed memorandum on the necessity of defending Scapa Flow from submarine attack.

Scapa FlowAlthough Scapa Flow was unfortified, Churchill was satisfied that the Fleet was safe. As he later wrote, it was “protected by its currents from submarine attack. Destroyers no doubt could attack it—if they cared to run the very serious risk of the long daylight passage, to and fro, across the North Sea: but no one, we had believed, could take a submarine submerged through the intricate and swirling channels.”1 The British Admiralty were also comforted by the opinion that Scapa was beyond the effective range of German U-boats.

Jellicoe, however, was not convinced. On 30 September he wrote to Churchill, “I long for a submarine defence at Scapa. It would give such a feeling of confidence. I cannot sleep half so well inside as when outside, mainly because I feel we are risking such a mass of vulnerable ships in a place where, if a submarine did get in, she practically has the British Fleet at her mercy up to the number of torpedoes.”2 According to Churchill, Jellicoe telegraphed a report on 17 October that a German submarine had been reported entering Scapa: “Although he [Jellicoe] thought the report false, he took the whole fleet to sea forthwith. He appealed for submarine obstructions, as he had ‘no safe base at present.’…On the 18th he stated that Scapa Flow should not be used till the Submarine Defence was placed.”3

Churchill thought that Jellicoe was overreacting, but on 23 October he wrote to him, “Every effort will be made to secure you rest and safety in Scapa and adjacent anchorages.”4 So to placate the fears of the Commander, defence improvements were made, although not so fast as Jellicoe would have liked. The improved defences included nineteen old ships being sunk across the five most vulnerable channels leading into Scapa Flow.

Nevertheless, German U-boats did attempt to enter the sound. On 23 November U 18, commanded by Kapitan Leutnant Heinrich von Hennig, entered Hoxa Sound on the surface. Hennig, though, was disappointed to see that the Grand Fleet had gone. He could have gone after “smaller fry” in the harbour but decided that this was not worth the gamble. Instead he undertook the tricky operation of returning to open sea.

Although no successful enemy action was ever launched in Scapa Flow during the First World War, the German Fleet was in evidence in the area. On 5 June 1916, the British cruiser Hampshire sailed out of the Hoxa Boom with an important passenger, the War Minister, Lord Kitchener. He was being taken to Archangel in northern Russia to confer with the Tsar’s government. The weather was bad, but Kitchener was anxious to reach his destination as soon as possible. Jellicoe and his staff decided that the ship would take the inside passage, on the west coast of the Orkneys, to give some protection. Because of the bad weather, however, minesweeping had not been possible for four days beforehand. Tragically, Hampshire struck mines and all on board perished, including Kitchener.

The Armistice of 11 November 1918 ended the war; but what to do with the German fleet? After discussions among the Allies, it was agreed that seventy-four German warships would be sailed to Scapa Flow. But it was not until 23 June 1919 that the Versailles Treaty was signed.  With the real possibility that the German Government would reject the terms—even days before the actual signing—the German Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Ludwig von Reuter, concerned that the Allies would seize his ships, took a fatal step on 21 June to scuttle his fleet. The “Abandon Ship” signal was given. One after the other the seacocks and flood valves of the German ships were opened as the sailors took to lifeboats. In all, fifty-two vessels went down.

Between the Wars

The inter-war years saw the removal of the obstructions that had been installed in the war. But this was child’s play compared to the daunting task of raising the sunken German fleet. However, various firms were attracted to the potential profits from the scrap metal. Some backed off when unexpected problems ensued, but the London steel-and-iron merchants Cox and Danks undertook what has been called the greatest salvage feat in history. With the assistance of other firms, they were successful in raising all but seven of the German vessels.

In January 1939, with war clouds looming, Scapa Flow was once more front and centre in the eyes of the British Admiralty and was again designated home base of the Fleet. The first priority was given to protection from the German Luftwaffe. Twenty-four Heavy Anti-Aircraft guns were installed, and two fighter squadrons were stationed nearby at Wick on the Scottish mainland.

Despite the precautions, the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, had the same anxieties as had Jellicoe twenty-five years earlier. He was not alone. On 24 March, the Commanding Officer Coast of Scotland reported to the Secretary of the Navy Admiralty, “It is now disclosed for the first time navigable channels still exist through Kirk Sound.”5 He requested a comprehensive survey of these channels. This was duly carried out, and on 26 May the Admiralty reported that “no risk at present exists of submerged entry by Holm or Water Sound and that entry on the surface will be extremely hazardous.” The Admiralty concluded that it “doubted if the further proposed measures would be found to provide 100% security against a determined attempt at entry by enemy craft on the surface though such an attempt is considered extremely unlikely,” and that “further expenditure on blocking cannot be justified.”6

Forbes was not satisfied with this decision, and he wrote to the Admiralty quoting a letter written to him by another senior officer, Admiral Sir William French, the Admiral Commanding Orkney and Shetland, who visited Scapa in June. This pointed out that French had informed him that he would have no hesitation in transiting Kirk or Skerry Sounds in either a submarine or a destroyer. Forbes asked for urgent reconsideration of the Admiralty’s decision not to block the channels, and he concluded—again echoing Jellicoe’s feelings in the prior war—that “Unless these channels are effectively blocked, the C-in-C cannot be free from constant anxiety as to the safety of his ships from submarine or destroyer attack.”7 Eventually, on 4 July the Admiralty agreed that three more ships would be sunk in Kirk and Water Sounds; but this action, alas, was not completed in time to save HMS Royal Oak.
SMS Baden being salvaged in Scapa FlowSMS Baden being salvaged in Scapa Flow

The Second World War

W ar was declared on 3 September 1939 with forty-four ships of the Fleet in Scapa Flow. On 15 September the new First Lord, Winston Churchill, left London for Scapa accompanied by Sir Archibald Sinclair, Brendan Bracken, and the Admiralty Flag Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander “Tommy” Thompson. “With Churchill in his locked box of papers,” Martin Gilbert documented, “were the secret minutes of a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee…at which the defence of Scapa had been discussed. It was clear from these minutes that the full scheme of defences would only be ready ‘by the spring of 1940.’”8

Gilbert continues:

In naval matters, reflecting on his visit to Scapa Flow, he [Churchill] advised that the Fleet should not be “tethered,” as he had seen it. “These next few days are full of danger.” His warning was timely, but not acted upon in time. Two days later, on October 14, a German submarine penetrated the Scapa Flow defences and sank the battleship Royal Oak then at anchor; more than eight hundred officers and men were drowned.9

One of Churchill’s private secretaries, John  Higham, recalled, “When I brought the news to Churchill, tears sprang to his eyes and he muttered, ‘Poor fellows, poor fellows, trapped in those black depths.’”10

Later that day Churchill reported to the War Cabinet that “HMS Royal Oak, a battleship of the ‘R’ class, had been sunk between 1 a.m. and 2 a.m. that morning. She was moored in Scapa Flow at the time, and it was believed that she had been attacked by a submarine which, by some unknown means, had penetrated the defences….All ships in the Flow had immediately been ordered to raise steam, and put to sea.” There followed a cold statement recognizing that in war tragic losses had to be expected: “The loss of this ship, though an extremely regrettable disaster, did not materially affect the general naval position.”11

Two days later, on 16 October, Churchill reported again to the War Cabinet:

The Germans still did not appear to have any information as to how the Royal Oak had been sunk; he therefore did not propose to publish any further information for the time being. He thought, however, that it was only a question of time before the news became known, and he therefore proposed to make an announcement in the House of Commons the next day….The Prime Minister asked what steps had been taken to prevent another enemy submarine getting in Scapa Flow. The First Lord of the Admiralty said that the Admiralty were satisfied that the enemy submarine had got into Scapa Flow on an occasion when the gate had been left open for a considerable time, owing to certain ships which were due to enter the harbour having been three-quarters of an hour late. There had been over-confidence in the immunity of the Flow to submarine attack. The Flow would be made thoroughly safe by the 7th of November.12

In his report to the House of Commons on 17 October, Churchill spoke of the loss of the Royal Oak and of merchant shipping. “There will not be in this war any period when the seas will be completely safe,” Churchill said, “but neither will there be, I believe and trust, any period when the full necessary traffic of the Allies cannot be carried on. We shall suffer and we shall suffer continually, but by perseverance, and by taking measures on the largest scale, I feel no doubt that in the end we shall break their hearts.”13

Due to Churchill’s short time back at the Admiralty, he was given “slack” by the opposition, with a former (and future) First Lord, A.V. Alexander, politely asking “the First Lord whether he is aware, as I’m sure he must be, that the circumstances which he has been bound to report are very disturbing, and that perhaps we ought to know whether at the outbreak of the war, there was or was not a systematic survey carried out at the place quoted to ensure that it still remained a safe naval anchorage.” Churchill responded: “Yes, Sir. The boom defences have been maintained and, of course, they are not the old defences from the last war; they have been newly placed in position. There is an inquiry sitting, which will not take very long, and I should like to have the advantage of reading its report before I go into details of this kind.”14

On 28 October, Churchill received the Admiralty report on the sinking, and he informed the War Cabinet that day that the U-boat had in fact entered the Flow through an unguarded entrance. He further stated, “The lesson was clear that we could not take anything for granted, and must be continually on the watch and guarding against every conceivable contingency in our defences.” His War Cabinet colleagues discussed the statement that the First Lord would have to make in the House of Commons, concluding, “It would have to be admitted that the anchorage at Scapa had been unsafe against submarine attack, but it should be made clear that the necessary defences were being provided.”15

On 31 October Churchill went to Scapa again, accompanied by Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, where a second conference was held on Admiral Forbes’s flagship. “The scale of defences upon which we now agreed included reinforcement of the boom and additional blockships in the exposed eastern channels, as well as controlled minefields and other devices.”16

Home at Last

On 12 March 1940 Scapa Flow was deemed safe, and the Fleet returned. Churchill wrote, “I thought I would give myself the treat of being present on this occasion in our naval affairs.”17 When he arrived in Scapa he was comforted that

More than six months of constant exertion and the highest priorities had repaired the peacetime neglect. The three main entrances were defended with booms and mines, and three additional block-ships, among others, had already been placed in Kirk Sound through which [the] U-boat had slipped to destroy the Royal Oak…. At last the Home Fleet had a home. It was the famous home from which in the previous war the Royal Navy had ruled the seas.18


Endnotes

1. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911–1918 (London: Odhams, 1938), vol. I, pp. 342–43.

2. Ibid., p. 349.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., pp. 351–52.

5. W. S. Hewison, This Great Harbour, Scapa Flow (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2005), p. 210.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 211.

8. Martin Gilbert, Finest Hour, Winston S. Churchill, 1939–1941 (London: Heinemann, 1984), p. 30.

9. Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life (London: Heinemann, 1991), p. 628.

10. Ibid.

11. Martin Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers, At the Admiralty, September 1939–May 1940 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993),  pp. 240–41.

12. Ibid., pp. 244–45.

13. Gilbert, Churchill: A Life, p. 628.

14. Gilbert, At the Admiralty, p. 257.

15. Ibid., p. 305.

16. Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 492.

17. Ibid., p. 568.

18. Ibid., p. 571.

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