June 23, 2015

Finest Hour 114, Spring 2002

Page 37

Abstract by David Freeman

Witherell, Larry L, “Lord Salisbury’s Watching Committee and the Fall of Neville Chamberlain, May 1940.” English Historical Review, November 2001: pp. 1134-66.


In early 1940 the 4th Marquess of Salisbury (son of the late Prime Minister) established a self-styled “Watching Committee” to monitor the domestic political scene and press for the creation of a true National Government. While the existence of this committee has long been known, it has received insufficient scholarly attention. The collection of Committee materials in the Salisbury and Emrys Evans papers provides the first detailed examination of its formation, membership and activities, and establishes that Salisbury’s Committee played an essential role in the political drama of 1940.

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The principal figures responsible for the Committee’s formation included Lord Salisbury; his son Viscount Cranborne (known as “Bobbety” and subsequently the 5th Marquess); Robert, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood (brother of the 4th Marquess); and Viscount Wolmer (later the 3rd Earl of Selborne and a nephew of the 4th Marquess). Thus, the core of the Committee consisted entirely of Cecils, one of England’s oldest and most respected aristocratic and political families.

The Cecils had been among the few calling for British rearmament in the late 1930s. In the days prior to Munich, Salisbury characterized Chamberlain’s foreign policy as flawed, dangerous and morally repugnant. After Munich, the rhetoric became harsher, with Lord Cranborne sarcastically asking, “Where is the honour?” in the Prime Minister’s “peace with honour.” Following the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, Lord Cecil of Chelwood denounced Chamberlain for sacrificing the Czechs. The Prime Minister replied by raging against those whom he called the “glamour boys…particularly Bobbety Cranborne, who is the most dangerous of the lot.”

Chamberlain did bring Churchill and Eden into the Government, but this also had the effect of decapitating the two main dissident groups within the Tory ranks and muzzling their leaders. Salisbury then feared that Chamberlain would fall back on his unacceptable policies. As the autumn of 1939 wore on, the Cecils began to attract other malcontents, and Cranborne proposed to organize their activity by establishing “a small committee…of very respectable Conservatives…who would exercise pressure on the Cabinet.” Numerous respected Conservatives were quickly recruited.

The Watching Committee held its first meeting on 4 April 1940 and requested that Salisbury, now elected chairman, impress upon the Prime Minister their desire to reform and reconstruct the cabinet along lines set

out by Leo Amery: a small War Cabinet of non-departmental ministers to formulate and supervise policy unencumbered by the burden of administrative responsibilities. The energetic Richard Law, son of the late Prime Minister, set the Committee’s focus: “I submit we ought to continue [to attack the Government] The more we weaken the Government, I honestly believe, we strengthen England.”

Chamberlain met with Salisbury on 10 April and rejected the Committee’s proposed reform of the War Cabinet, commenting that “if people did not like the administration of the present Government they could change it.” Salisbury reported the disappointing results to his colleagues, who were soon joined by other leaders outside the Committee. Clement Davies, Liberal MP for Montgomeryshire, provided the Marquess with a sweeping but penetrating assessment of the Government’s conduct of the war. Davies also believed in the need for a truly National Government which included Labour and added: “I think the situation demands a change even of the Captain of the Team.”

Next, Salisbury arranged to meet with Churchill on 19 April. The First Lord of the Admiralty, however, was “resolutely opposed to any change which would deprive him of this great position of authority and usefulness in order to be a mere chairman without power.” Salisbury explained that his Committee contemplated no diminution of Churchill’s authority and prophetically warned that “if the Allies met with a reverse in Norway, that would be fatal to the Government.”

Salisbury then headed a delegation to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, on 29 April to present their grievances. Halifax remonstrated, but as another attendee (Amery) recorded, “the evercourteous Salisbury” replied bluntly: “we are not satisfied.”

Faced with the adamant refusal of the Government to reform its policies, the Committee now was forced to address the issue of Chamberlain’s premiership. An unsigned document found among General Spears’s Watching Committee papers expresses the recognition that since “the Conservative Party made the present Government only the Conservative Party can destroy it.” As the Committee met on 30 April, the Government was preparing to evacuate troops from Norway. Nicholson recorded the “general impression is that we may lose the war.”

As the date for Chamberlain’s statement to the House on Norway approached, Salisbury designated a agroup of hard-liners to be ready to meet on short notice should exigencies require their “special attention.”

The group consisted of Amery, Viscount Cecil, Hastings, Home, Lloyd, Macmillan, Spears, Swinton, Trenchard, Emrys Evans, Wolmer, Cranborne and Salisbury—all unsympathetic to Chamberlain. After the PM’s disappointing presentation in Parliament, discussions about alternative ministries began. But all the names contemplated managed to raise objections in some quarter. Nicholson lamented: “We always say that our advantage over the German leadership principle is that we can always find another leader. Now we cannot.”

Efforts continued. Davies was now serving as intermediary between Salisbury’s Committee and the Labour Party leaders. The issue was whether there was “a sufficient possibility of agreement for a joint move to replace Chamberlain.” Davies solicited Labour’s front bench to force a no-confidence vote during the Norway debate, but Attlee and Greenwood lacked faith that Conservative rebels could be relied upon to vote against their Prime Minister and feared an attack would merely provoke Tory backbenchers to rally round the Government.

In fact, the Watching Committee had effectively collected Conservative discontent in one group and provided a constructive outlet for members’ energies and ideas. When their reform proposals had been brusquely rejected, their frustration intensified. The Norway Debate would provide them with their first opportunity to challenge the Prime Minister directly.

The debate went badly for the Government. Committee ally Admiral Sir Roger Keyes delivered a melodramatic but effective attack in full-dress uniform. Committee zealot Amery followed with the Cromwellian cry, “In the name of God go!” These performances, and the continued representations by Davies, convinced Attlee to force a vote of confidence.

Meeting early on 8 May, the Committee agreed to support a “change of Government,” i.e., the departure of Chamberlain. The question was whether members should vote directly against the Government or merely abstain in the confidence vote. They agreed to vote against the Government.

When the House divided on the evening of 8 May, the core Conservative opposition came from the Watching Committee: Amery, Cooper, Emrys Evans, Keeling, Law, Macmillan, Nicholson, Spears, and Wolmer. They were joined by close friends and allies, including Keyes, Lady Astor (wife of a Committee member), H.J. Duggan, Quentin Hogg (son of Lord Hailsham, another Committee member), Mark Patrick, and Ronald Tree. This enlarged group then brought along seventeen more Conservative backbenchers, including several in uniform, leading to a total of thirty-three Tory votes against the Government, while another sixty-five Conservatives abstained. Chamberlain still prevailed but by the vastly reduced margin of 281-200, which left his followers in disarray.

The Watching Committee had pushed the PM into a corner, and with Labour unwilling to serve under him, his options became ever more restricted. After presiding over his Committee on the morning after the vote of confidence, 9 May, Salisbury met with Halifax to convey its terms to the Government: “Neville should now resign and either Halifax or Winston form a real War Cabinet on National lines.”

Halifax actually concurred, and they discussed a successor. The Foreign Secretary stated that “he himself is the obvious first choice…he looked upon himself as fully responsible for all Mr. Chamberlain’s policy, and secondly that Mr. Churchill must if he himself is Prime Minister, be the leader of the House of Commons. Such a combination would turn out to be impracticable with the Prime Minister nominally in the Lords.”

Although Salisbury politely disabused Halifax of such a conclusion, the meeting nevertheless ended with Halifax firmly excluding himself as Chamberlain’s successor.

When word arrived on 10 May of the German invasion of the Low Countries, Salisbury promptly summoned a meeting of the Watching Committee to consider both this news and the ongoing political crisis. Shortly afterwards Law, Nicholson and Emrys Evans learned that Chamberlain now intended to remain in office “until the French battle is finished.” Emrys Evans telephoned Salisbury, who declared that the Committee must maintain its resolve: Chamberlain must go, and “Winston should be made Prime Minister during the course of the day.”

Chamberlain was warned that the Committee would not allow him to hang on and delay reconstruction because of the invasion. The Committee insisted that the House approve a new government by 13 May. Later the same day Salisbury twice met with the King’s private secretary, emphasizing that the Committee was adamant about Chamberlain’s immediate departure.

The outmaneuvered Prime Minister submitted his resignation that afternoon, and Churchill was promptly summoned and charged with forming a new government. The following day, 11 May, Davies learned that Churchill was considering Chamberlain for Chancellor of the Exchequer. He passed this to Amery, and asked Lord Salisbury to intervene with the new Prime Minister. The Committee had previously agreed that Chamberlain ought not to remain in government. But Salisbury pressed through a compromise whereby the disgraced Conservative leader would remain a symbolic member of the Government as Lord President of the Council.

Lord Salisbury had not sought the overthrow of Neville Chamberlain when he first began to assemble “a small body of consultative counselors.” He had merely complied with the obligation to public service long shouldered by his family. This, however, is not to deny what they judged to be the lack of Chamberlain’s abilities and the failure of his policies. By establishing the Watching Committee and selecting its membership, Lord Salisbury provided substance, leadership, legitimacy and energy to a previously lethargic if not impotent faction of Conservative critics.

But the Committee was more. It represented a synergistic coalition of political talent intentionally assembled for the purpose of influencing the Government and enhancing Britain’s security. When, however, the Committee’s constructive efforts were summarily rebuffed, the laws of political motion necessitated a new objective: the removal of Chamberlain from office. The Committee waited only for the requisite opportunity, which they found in the Norway debate. While the final push required the collaboration and voting strength of the Labour opposition, the Watching Committee—the advance guard—nevertheless prevailed.

Opinions

Prof. David Freeman:
Professor Witherell sheds new light on our understanding of how Churchill became Prime Minister. The traditional view has been that, in the end, Labour made Churchill Prime Minister by refusing to serve under Chamberlain. Additionally, according to Churchill’s memoirs, Halifax took himself out of the running at the last minute in a meeting with Chamberlain and Churchill on the morning of 10 May. Now we learn that Halifax had already done as much the day before, and for the same reason, in a meeting with Lord Salisbury.

Halifax may, nevertheless, have hesitated to speak on 10 May (Churchill recalls a “very long pause”) in a last-ditch hope that Churchill might still defer to him. But even if Churchill had not outlasted the Foreign Secretary during that historic moment of silence, it seems clear from Salisbury’s recollection that the Watching Committee chairman’s insistence on the 9th that either Halifax or Churchill become PM was merely pro forma. When Halifax excused himself, the “ever-courteous” Salisbury made a further pro forma statement to the effect that being a Peer was no bar to being Prime Minister but also perfunctorily ended the conversation because Halifax had arrived at the “right” choice. The conclusion that I reach from this article is that, while Labour did serve as the mechanism for replacing Chamberlain with Churchill, the real driving force was the cabal of true-blue Conservatives led by Lord Salisbury.

Churchill’s elevation to the premiership depended on many variables beyond his own control for his destiny to have been inevitable. But there is no rule that says history had to happen the way it did. Nor is there any requirement that the best qualified person will always—or indeed ever—be selected for the position of supreme leadership.

After the war, with Churchill a national hero, everyone wanted to claim proprietary interest in his success. For the Conservatives this was easy. Churchill remained their party leader for almost fifteen years. Labour had a strong claim as well: its leaders had served with distinction in the Churchill coalition. But after the generation of war leaders had passed from the scene, it became more politically expedient for Labour to assert that it was their party that had come to the rescue in May 1940 against the intransigent Tory establishment, in effect “liberating” Churchill from the shackles of his own party.

This interpretation cannot be sustained. In reality, well-entrenched leaders of the Conservative establishment had been the driving force behind the Great Change. As General Spears recorded: “The Conservative Party made the present Government [and] only the Conservative Party can destroy it.” Labour’s interest remains rooted, not only in the war service of its leaders, but in the millions of rankand-file Labour supporters. We need to remember what Churchill told the cheering crowds of London on V-E Day: “This is your victory!”

Prof. John Ramsden:
Professor Witherell’s paper is important testimony to the patriotic role of Salisbury and his Committee. I tend to agree with those who have considered that this new information is somewhat less than revolutionary, and so more or less does Witherell. His paper tells us quite a bit about how Chamberlain fell, but much less about how Churchill, rather than someone else, came to replace him. It’s particularly weak in suggesting that Salisbury and his committee ensured that Chamberlain did not become Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Churchill Government, since Churchill gave him a bigger job instead, as effective deputy Prime Minister and supremo of the home front, something he could not have done if Chamberlain had been drowning in the financial detail of treasury work. While Larry Witherell has made a fine contribution to our understanding of the events, I don’t believe he would wish us to exaggerate the importance of his revelations.


Prof. Freeman earned his Ph.D. in Modern British History from Texas A&M University, and presently teaches at California State University Fullerton.

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